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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FEMINIST 
CRITIQUES OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION 
Frances Olsen • 
Most of the work that I have published that deals with the 
topic of this symposium ("Private Power and the Constitution") 
raises questions about the "private" part of the title.t "Private" is 
not a natural attribute nor descriptive in a factual sense, but rather 
is a political and contestable designation.z Thus, for me, the topic 
suggests such questions as, "What does the person who wields 
power gain by successfully characterizing his power as 'private'?" 
and "What role does our written Constitution play in that 
advantage?" 
One of the main things a power-holder gains from successfully 
characterizing his power as "private" is a degree of legitimacy and 
immunity from attack. Thus, it is predictable that people will try to 
characterize their use of power as "private" and to characterize 
power deployed against them as "not private" -that is, as public, 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Except for notes 2, 4, 14 
and 15, the footnotes were added by Christina Bull, UCLA Class of 1994, to this talk I 
presented to the AALS meeting in January, 1993. 
I. E.g., Frances Olsen, Does Enough Work Make Women Free? Part-Time and Full-
Time Work Strategies for Women in the United States and Germany, 53 Indian J. of Social 
Work 599 (1992); Frances Olsen, Sex Bias in International Law: The UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 53 Indian J. of Social Work 491 (1992); Frances Olsen, Children's Rights: 
Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 Int'l 
J.L. & Family 192 (1992); Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 105, 
109-17 (1989); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. 
J.L. Ref. 835 (1985) ("Myth"); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 387-90 (1984); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: 
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983) ("Family and 
Market"). 
2. There is more to the assertion that privacy is contestable than simply that "public" 
and "private" are matters of degree rather than all-or-nothing: If one thing seems Jess public 
than another, the first may be considered private with respect to the more public thing, even 
though it might seem public if compared to something more private. More than this, how-
ever, public and private are used as normative claims about how something should be treated 
rather than just descriptions of the nature of that thing (or the agreed perceptions in our 
society about the thing). Privacy can be asserted or denied in numerous and varied contexts. 
Cf. Olsen, Myth at 835, 858-61 (cited in note I) (illustrating some of the ways that state 
"intervention" in the family may be perceived as taking place or not taking place, even in 
similar circumstances). 
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oppressive, unjustified and unconstitutional. Struggles over power 
inform, fuel, and permeate the debate over the public/private di-
chotomy. At issue is support for or opposition to the status quo. 
An actor who can successfully characterize his activity as "pri-
vate" may gain either of two quite different constitutional advan-
tages. First, the designation of conduct as "private" relates to the 
state action doctrine.3 lfbehavior is "private," those harmed by the 
action cannot successfully invoke the Fourteenth Amendment or 
most other provisions of the federal Constitution.4 In general, the 
Constitution protects against "public" violations, not "private" vio-
lations. The state action doctrine limits the scope of constitutional 
rights and limitations. 
Second, "privacy" may be invoked as a right which itself pro-
vides a substantive limit on state action permitted by the constitu-
tion. Thus, some so-called "private" activity receives a degree of 
protection against state action that might interfere with the "pri-
vate" action.s An actor who can successfully characterize his activ-
3. For a discussion of the state action doctrine and the public/private distinction, see 
Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982). The state action doctrine maintains that most provisions of the 
Constitution protect individuals only from governmental action and do not limit or restrict 
private action. Therefore, private actors can engage in activity, such as discrimination, that 
would be unconstitutional if practiced by the government. The state action doctrine is pre· 
mised on the notion that the Constitution defines the relationship between the government 
and the individual, not the relationship between private individuals. Concerned with per· 
sonal liberty, the state action doctrine effectively protects private action as well as restricting 
government action. 
As the papers in this symposium point out, the state action doctrine has been defined at 
some times broadly and at other times narrowly. In recent years, the state action doctrine 
has been narrowly defined, so most activity has been defined as private. The government 
must be significantly involved with the private activity, or the private activity must be some-
thing which is usually a public function. However, even if the government financially sup-
ports the activity, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), or licenses and regulates the 
activity, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), there is not enough government 
interaction to constitutionally protect those who have been harmed by the action. There is 
some indication that there must be either state decisionmaking or state compulsion before the 
state action doctrine will limit behavior. See Blum, supra, Rendell-Buker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 
830 (1982). 
4. AD important exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides that neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude "shall exist within the United States." For a creative and 
important argument that this provision should be read to provide a constitutional right for 
children against child abuse, see Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as 
Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992). See 
also Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women. Involuntary Servitude and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 207 (1992) (examining the relationship be-
tween involuntary servitude and intimate violence). The Fourteenth Amendment provides in 
contrast merely that "no state shall" abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens, "nor 
shall any state" deprive a citizen of various things "without due process" or deny "equal 
protection of the laws." 
5. The constitutional right to privacy has been invoked to protect intimate family deci-
sions from state intervention. The protected activity is generally personal in nature, and the 
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ity as "private" may gain the advantage of constitutional protection 
against state interference. 
There is also a third important use of characterizing behavior 
as "private," which is less discussed in constitutional law but is par-
ticularly relevant to feminist critiques of the public/private distinc-
tion. Private may mean personal and domestic, as opposed to 
commercial; of the family rather than of the marketplace; home 
rather than work. An actor who can successfully characterize his 
activity as "private" in this third sense may or may not be able to 
invoke a constitutional "right to privacy" (that is, "privacy" in the 
second sense) but he may nevertheless be able to discourage state 
action that would inhibit his use of power, on the basis that domes-
tic life should remain more free of government regulation than other 
aspects of life. 6 
Criticisms of the public/private dichotomy may relate to the 
state action doctrine, to the right to privacy, to the family/market 
dichotomy, or to some combination of these concepts. 
Most of the papers in this symposium presuppose a familiarity 
with the public/private distinction and with standard criticisms of 
issues revolve around a respect for individual autonomy and human dignity. But almost all 
protected activity is within the framework of the family. The court has generally relied on 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the right to privacy, to protect individu-
als' rights outside the family structure. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990). 
The right to privacy has covered a wide range of personal choices. See, e.g. Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (child rearing); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 
(1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (family living 
arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) 
(procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (education of children). 
6. Domestic violence has traditionally not been investigated or prosecuted, in part be-
cause it is a "private concern." Because it occurs within the family, police and courts have 
been hesitant to intervene. See William A. Stacey and Anson Shupe, The Family Secret: 
Domestic Violence in America 153 (Beacon Press, 1983); Margaret Martin, Battered Women, 
in Nancy Hutchings, ed., The Violent Family: Victimization of Women, Children, and Elders 
82 (Human Sciences Press, 1988); see also Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspec-
tives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique 151, 154-57 (Pantheon, 2d ed. 1990); Carol H. Lefcourt, ed., 
Women and the Law§ 9.01 at 9-3 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992) (discussing conception 
of domestic violence as a "private privilege of marriage"). Domestic violence is also a crime 
which is difficult for the victim to report, due to its situation within the family. Conse-
quently, it is one of the most underreported crimes. Stephen R. Couch, Research on Wife 
Abuse: A Scan of the Literature, in Joseph J. Costa ed., Abuse of Women: Legislation, Report-
ing, and Prevention 2 (Lexington Books, 1983). 
Similarly, child abuse has often been allowed to continue because it is considered within 
the domain of parental discretion. See Roberta Gottesman, The Child and the Law 33-34 
(West Pub. Co., 1981) (emphasizing the primacy of parental discipline), Laurence D. Houl-
gate, The Child & the State: A Normative Theory of Juvenile Rights xii (Johns Hopkins U. 
Press, 1980) (positing that children are similar to the property of parents, in that parents have 
original rights). 
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the public/private distinction. Many of the papers treat the attack 
on the distinction as old hat or as obvious, as having no critical bite, 
or as probably exaggerated or wrong. This talk is a prelude to a 
brief, lucid, description of feminist critiques of the public/private 
distinction-a paper which I decided to write because last year I 
was teaching a legal theory course at the University of Frankfurt, 
Neuere Entwicklung in der anglo-amerikanischen Rechtstheorie, 
and very much wanted to give my students such a description but 
couldn't find one. 
Criticism of the public/private distinction takes place on at 
least three levels. The first level of criticism questions the particular 
allocation between public and private. As students in the lower half 
of our classes put it, "Gee, the public/private distinction is hard." 
Or, as our better students are more likely to recognize, "Aha! The 
public/private distinction is open to interesting manipulation by a 
skillful constitutional lawyer." This first level of criticism presup-
poses that there is state action and there is private action. The prob-
lem is sorting out the middle-or more radically, that all private 
action can be made to look public and vice versa. 1 
Many feminist critiques take place on this first level. The so-
called first wave of American feminism in the nineteenth century 
focused much attention upon women's exclusion from public life, 
challenging the particular divide between public and private life.s It 
also offered some interesting critiques of privacy as concealment of 
information about domestic or personal lives, which I won't go into 
here. The so-called second wave of feminism is sometimes said to 
have focused primary attention upon the public/private distinc-
tion.9 Women in the anti-war and civil rights movements began 
politicizing the traditional sexual division of labor that was perpe-
trated within these protest groups that were ostensibly struggling 
for major social change. An illustration of this focus on the public/ 
private distinction is the familiar slogan "the personal is political." 
Consciousness-raising groups-a crucial institution of feminism in 
the late 1970s and 1980siO-played an important role in the wo-
7. See generally Olsen, Myth (cited in note 1). See also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages 
of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982). 
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York on Wo-
men's Rights, reprinted in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony: Correspondence, Writ-
ings. Speeches 44-52 (Ellen C. DuBois, ed., Schocken Books, 1981). 
9. The first wave of feminism challenged women's exclusion from public life and 
sought to inject women into the public sphere. The second wave of feminism, however, 
sought to politicize this distinction, stressing the utility of one's private experience as a basis 
for public action. 
10. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 83-105 (Harv. 
U. Press, 1989); Anita Shreve, Women Together, Women Alone 6 (Viking, 1989) (discussing 
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men's movement to politicize the so-called "personal" domination 
that individual women experienced in their domestic and sexual 
lives.11 Some husbands were distressed by the "public" discussion 
of their intimate relations in consciousness-raising groups.12 
Many of the feminist arguments for more state intervention in 
the family are based on this first level of criticism of the public/ 
private distinction. Feminist lawyers have objected to the with-
drawal of the law from the so-called domestic sphere on the basis 
that the withdrawal left women unprotected from abuse and gave 
the ideological message that domestic life was less important than 
commercial life or other aspects of society governed by law.D It 
should no longer be overlooked that while police and district attor-
neys have tended to treat the matter as private when a husband 
beats his wife, and to suggest that they should let the couple work 
out their differences, police and district attorneys have always 
treated it as public when the wife shoots the husband, never seeing 
that as one way for the couple to work out their differences. 14 
The movement against sexual violence against women and 
against sexual abuse more generally pointed out how the asserted 
"privacy" of things sexual resulted in very limited protection for 
women against sex crimes. The slogan that "rape is about violence 
not sex" was an effort to move rape from the "private" realm, 
where it was all too often tolerated or subjected to minimal con-
trols,Js to the "public" realm, where one might expect the criminal 
the impact of consciousness-raising groups on the women's movement); see also Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, !03 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 863-67 (1990) (discussing con-
sciousness-raising as a means to translate personal experience into a basis for social change). 
Consciousness-raising groups, predominant in the 1970s, met so that women could share 
their common experiences, and from that knowledge, understand the political nature of their 
individual subordination. Consciousness-raising was meant to "break down the barriers be-
tween women, encourage open communication among them, and help them develop pride in 
their sex." Shreve, Women Together. Women Alone at 12. 
11. Consciousness-raising groups were effective because they facilitated women's reali-
zation that their personal subjugation was in fact political oppression. "By realizing that an 
individual problem was in reality a common problem, and by discovering that the personal 
was really collective, a woman might begin to understand how a sexist society had limited her 
opportunities." Shreve, Women Together, Women Alone at 14-15 (cited in note 10). 
12. See id. at 86. 
13. See Taub and Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of 
Law, in Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique at 151-57 (cited in note 6). 
14. If society were serious about stopping domestic abuse, there are methods that might 
be more effective than permitting battered women to kill their abusers. For example, instead 
of narrow injunctions against violence that are notoriously unenforceable, courts could issue 
orders preventing known abusers from drinking alcohol or doing whatever other activities 
typically precede the abuse. In those cases in which an abused partner can identify a set 
pattern of behavior preceding violence, it could be possible to break the pattern-whether by 
a consent decree, as a condition of probation or dropping charges, or under the courts' equity 
powers. 
15. Feminists have complained that rape is not forbidden, but merely regulated. See 
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law would be applied in a reasonable manner to punish and deter 
rape.I6 This critique was expanded into a critique of the complex 
and subtle ways in which the power that men as a group exercised 
over women as a group was seen all too much as private.11 
In a similar vein, women have questioned why it is that men 
are so able to see the appeal of laws placing limits on the rights of 
the homeless to beg for money, especially as some of them do so 
aggressively and threateningly, and so unable to see any justification 
for laws limiting the rights of men to beg for sex, even when many 
of them do so aggressively and threateningly. Indeed many more 
men seize sexual pleasure of one form or another from women than 
homeless people seize money or other property from those who 
choose not to engage in the gratuitous transfer requested. 
On the second level of criticism, "public" and "private" are 
shown not to be analytic categories at all. On this level of critique, 
the problem is not just that private actions can be made to look like 
state action and vice versa, but rather that there really is no way to 
say that certain action is private action.Is I have often used the 
example of state intervention in the family to illustrate this point.I9 
Is the state intervening or not intervening if it allows a deceased 
man's same-sex lover instead of his parents to make funeral ar-
rangements? What is the non-interventionist state response, for ex-
ample, if parents try to reclaim their child from an aunt to whom 
the child has fted?2o 
For most of us, what we want to do and be left alone to do 
seems like private action-thus beating up one's son, oppressing 
one's workers, supporting a political party, discriminating against 
African-American customers, and publishing Salmon Rushdie's ad-
dress or the name of a rape victim are all considered private by the 
person who engages in the activity. The laws that facilitate the in-
jury of one person by another seem like state action when they seem 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Ju-
risprudence, 8 Signs 635, 651 (Summer 1983). Men have been allowed to rape-at various 
times in history-any woman who was not a virgin, any woman with whom he had previ-
ously had a relationship, or his wife. Some states continue to allow a man to rape his wife, 
even quite brutally, if she and he were still living together as a family at the time of the rape. 
16. Susan Brownmiller is the best-known writer associated with the claim that rape is 
about violence, not sex. She argues that rape is a primary mechanism of women's subordina-
tion. "[Rape is] not only a male prerogative, but man's basic weapon of force against woman, 
the principal agent of his will and her fear . . . . [Rape] is nothing more or less than a 
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear." Susan 
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 14-15 (Simon & Schuster, 1976). 
17. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1177 (1986). 
18. See supra note 7. 
19. See Olsen, Myth (cited in note 1). 
20. These examples are loosely drawn from Olsen, Myth at 858-59 (cited in note 1). 
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unjust, but go unnoticed or are treated as a neutral background of 
law to those who support the rules. Acts of racial discrimination 
which are now widely seen as state action used to seem like private 
action to those who supported discrimination.21 The interesting 
question is how the particular behavior is successfully characterized 
as private or public, and why the legitimation or delegitimation 
works. 
The important critical point is that injustice cannot be justified 
by means of the public/private distinction. Thus, I disagree with 
the assertion in Larry Alexander's paper that "absolutely nothing 
follows" from this criticism of the state action doctrine or of the 
public/private dichotomy.22 What follows from the criticism is that 
the asserted presence or absence of state action is not a justification 
for an otherwise unjust decision. 
On a third level of critique, deeper political meanings are found 
behind the appeal of privacy. Notions of individualism,23 of 
choice24 and of desire,2s and the reasons why we value privacy26 are 
deeply related to the peculiar importance placed on the male/fe-
male distinction and to the subordination of women. Privacy is re-
lated to manhood; "private parts" are sexual; and the classical 
liberal individual is not an asexual "person" but the male head of a 
family. Privacy is most enjoyed by those with power. To the pow-
erless, the private realm is frequently a sphere not of freedom but of 
uncertainty and insecurity.21 On this level of critique, the point is 
21. E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down laws prohibiting dis-
crimination by private companies providing public services, because there was not state ac-
tion); see supra note 3. 
22. Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Pri-
vate Power, 10 Const. Comm. 363, 369 (1993). 
23. See generally Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford U. Press, 1988) (ar-
guing that theories of individualism and social contract presuppose male dominance). 
24. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 90 (Harv. U. Press, 1987) 
(discussing the coercive nature of the gender hierarchy in the context of sex); Vicki Schultz, 
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the 
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 
1800-15 (1990) (describing the fallacy of choice in the context of employment decisions). 
25. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Femi-
nine, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 644, 689-96 (1990) (describing the gendered nature of desire). 
26. See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 99-100 (cited in note 24). 
27. Those without power are most likely to experience uncertainty within the realm of 
privacy. For example, forced sterilization has often been imposed on poor women. See 
Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978) (civil rights 
action for sterilizing patients based on race, number of children, and receipt of public assist-
ance). Another example would be police harassment of minorities. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. I, 14-15 (1968) (minorities often complain of wholesale harassment by the police); Rizzo 
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1976) (class action suit claiming pervasive pattern of mis-
treatment of minorities by police). From 1987 to 1990, 4400 complaints were filed against the 
Los Angeles Police Department. Forty-one percent of these complaints were filed by Afri-
can-Americans, although African-Americans account for only thirteen percent of the popula-
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not just that men enjoy a kind of privacy in the family that women 
and children do not enjoy (but rather too often suffer under). 
Rather, the standard situation in which one enjoys privacy and free-
dom is not a situation of equality but one of hierarchy. We virtually 
never all enjoy privacy equally, and the pretense that equality is the 
norm, and situations of domination an exception, is simply another 
way of maintaining the status quo. 
It is sometimes asked how women can criticize the public/pri-
vate distinction and still support privacy rights in other contexts: 
abortion rights and privacy rights for rape victims not to have their 
names published in the newspapers or to be forced at trial to discuss 
their private sexual lives.2s 
My answer to this question is twofold. First, it would be in-
consistent and unfair to women to create privacy rights in general 
but to exclude from that collection of rights a woman's choice re-
garding procreation, whether by using birth control or by abor-
tion.29 In addition, I see anti-abortion activity as simply a form of 
hassling or controlling women on the basis of their sexuality. It 
really has nothing to do with whether the woman involved or the 
state should make the private or non-private choice. The state's 
"choice" to protect embryos and fetuses or the fertilized and im-
planted egg and not, for example, to protect the sperm is not natu-
ral or logical any more than it is natural or logical to prefer male 
executors over female executors, which was found in Reed v. Reed3o 
to be irrational and thus a violation of equal protection. Men who 
consider it perfectly reasonable to restrict women wouldn't for an 
instant tolerate such controls on their own activity.JI 
Regarding rape shield laws, the issues here are relevancy and 
trying to reverse the serious underreporting and underenforcement 
of the crime of rape.32 Beyond the rape shield law issue, I believe 
tion. Jerome H. Skolnick and James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of 
Force 3 (The Free Press, 1993). 
28. Cf. Sylvia A. Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 Yale L.J. 1769, 
1778 ( 1986) (reviewing Zillah R. Eisenstein, Feminism and Sexual Equality (Monthly Review 
Press, 1984)) ("Feminists criticize the state's role in patriarchy, yet at the same time insist 
that collective responses are needed to protect vulnerable people and to organize the work 
that the patriarchal culture has traditionally assigned to women."). 
29. See Olsen, Unraveling Compromise at Ill and 116-17 (cited in note 1). 
30. 404 u.s. 71 (1971). 
31. See Frances Olsen, A Finger to the Devil: Abortion, Privacy, and Equality, 38 Dissent 
377 (Summer 1991); Olsen, Unraveling Compromise at 129·30 (cited in note I) (discussing 
controls that could be put on men to "protect unborn life"). 
32. Rapes are far underreported and underprosecuted. Jennifer Temkin, Women, Rape 
and Law Reform in Sylvana Tomaselli and Ray Porter, eds., Rape 21-24 (Blackwell, 1986). 
According to the Department of Justice, twenty-seven percent of unreported rapes are 
stated to be unreported because it is a "private or personal matter"; twenty-two percent are 
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that if it were not for our habits of thinking about public and pri-
vate, it would perhaps seem peculiar that what a victim of rape 
might have done that titillated the defendant is considered legally 
relevant while what a slain wife-beating husband did to terrorize his 
wife before she killed him is often not considered legally relevant. 
The experience of all too many women whose name appears in 
the newspapers, especially if it appears in any "sexual" context, is 
that they are targeted for harassing phone calls and further terror-
ized.33 Under these circumstances, concealment is necessary 
though not sufficient. Rapists and those who support the abuse of 
women use the threat of publicity to reduce the reporting and prose-
cution of their crime and to intimidate rape victims. Women do not 
want to be "private" victims of rape; they want sexual abuse and 
terrorism against women to stop. 
In conclusion, feminist critiques of the public/private distinc-
tion are multi-faceted and important. Although it might be possible 
to have a gender hierarchy without any public/private distinction,34 
the particular manner in which our present society draws distinc-
tions between public and private perpetuates the subordination of 
women. The point is not that everything should be public or that 
everything should be private; nor is mere tinkering around with the 
details of what belongs in the public category and what belongs in 
the private category likely to bring about significant and far-reach-
ing improvement in the role and status of women. What the best 
versions of the feminist critique of the public/private distinction try 
to achieve is a rethinking of how the categories "public" and "pri-
vate" are structured, a deeper analysis of how the status quo is 
maintained, and new approaches to theorizing social change. 
unreported because the victim perceives that the authorities would not care or would be 
unresponsive. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the United States. 1990 JJO.Jl. 
33. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528 (1989) (rape victim whose name was 
published in the paper was subsequently harassed, forcing her to move, change her phone 
number, and seek both counseling and police protection). According to a recent poll, forty· 
six percent of women said they would be less likely to report a rape if they knew their names 
would be made public. Sandra Sanchez, Rape Poll: No Names, Say 91%, U.S.A. Today, Apr. 
18, 1991, at lA. 
34. See Olsen, Unraveling Compromise at 116 (cited in note 1). 
